Effective Resource Management of Governments and Corruption by Liu, Cheol & Lee, Jekyung
KDI SCHOOL 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
KDI SCHOOL WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Effective Resource Management of 
Governments and Corruption
Cheol Liu 
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
Jekyung Lee 
University of Georgia
May, 2020
Working Paper  20-18
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
KDI School of Public Policy and Management Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.kdischool.ac.kr/new/eng/faculty/working.jsp
The Social Science Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3612522
* We are grateful to the KDI School of Public Policy and Management for providing financial support.
1
Effective Resource Management of Governments and Corruption
Abstract
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that public officials’ corruption is likely to degrade 
the quality of government management practices. By shedding light inside the classic “black box” 
idea of management, we explain how public corruption exerts a bad influence upon leadership, 
use of information and resource allocation. This bad influence of public corruption, as a 
consequence, will deteriorate the overall management quality of governments by weakening the 
integration of management subsystems. Data support our arguments by showing that increase in 
public corruption in an American state government decreases the probability significantly that the 
state may maintain its management excellence. The paper also demonstrates that infrastructure 
management of state governments is most vulnerable to corruption. Two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) regressions support the robustness of our model and the empirical 
results.
This study seeks to understand the potential impact of public officials’ corruption on government 
management quality. It also contributes to empirical work linking public corruption to 
governmental management capacity using data on the American states. Although most aspects of 
government management are affected by public officials’ corruption, studies on the influence of 
public corruption on government management quality are lacking. We contribute to fill the gap in 
the literature. This paper argues that public officials’ corruption worsens the quality of government 
management. Beyond explaining theoretically how public corruption can deteriorate government
management, we also provide empirical evidence of U.S. state governments. We note which 
management sectors of U.S. state governments are most vulnerable to corruption and suggest some 
policy implications accordingly.
Following Mauro (1995), we define public corruption as the “misuse of public office for 
private gain.” Corruption seems to exist everywhere at all times and affects government policy in 
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various ways. The impact of public corruption on economic and political variables is of special 
interest for researchers (Liu and Mikesell 2014). To our knowledge, however, theoretical and 
empirical studies on public corruption are scarce in U.S. public management and public 
administration fields. In particular, research on the association between public corruption and the 
quality of government management is wanting. Our corruption indexes calculate the number of 
U.S. public employees who are convicted of violations of the federal corruption-related laws. The 
U.S. Department of Justice publishes the numbers across the states annually.
For our theoretical argument, we benchmark the classic “black box” idea of management 
and shed some light inside the box. The original idea explains that the quality of government 
management will be affected by the integration of management subsystems, including human 
resource management, financial management, capital management and information technology. 
Moreover, the integration of these subsystems is affected by three key activities of management: 
“leadership, use of information, and resource allocation” (Ingraham and Donahue 2000). By 
integrating principal agent theory, bureau information monopoly model and rent-seeking model, 
we explain that public corruption distorts the three key activities of management, which implies 
that public officials’ corruption will deteriorate government management quality consequentially 
by hampering the ideal integration of management subsystems. The empirical results show that 
U.S. states with a higher level of public corruption are likely to have a lower grade of overall 
management quality, measured by the Government Performance Project (GPP). By applying 
various methods including two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) regressions, 
we take into account the potential endogeneity of our corruption variable and show that our model 
and empirical results are robust.
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Our ultimate future goal is to explore the determinants of governmental performance. 
However, it is beyond this study, which is concerned primarily with the efforts linking 
governmental management capacity to policy performance (Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham 2001). 
This effort may work like a stepping stone, which will be meaningful because government 
management can profoundly influence the outcomes and performance of governmental activities, 
which is an enduring concern of public management and public administration (Coggburn and 
Schnider 2003).
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2000) underline the importance of management quality to an 
understanding of government performance: “there is virtually always a need for management with 
respect to public sector activity, and, therefore, managerial behavior is almost always a factor in 
government performance.” There is little systematic investigation of the factors associated with 
state governments’ management capacity (Knack 2002). We build a model and find the 
determinants of governments’ management quality, which illustrates the impact of public 
corruption on management in the end. 
In this study, we try to answer three questions: What are the determinants of U.S. state 
governments’ management quality? How can public corruption affect government management 
quality? Which sector of government management is most vulnerable to public corruption in 
American states? 
This article is composed of six sections. The first section provides a literature review on 
issues related to government management quality and public officials’ corruption. Second, we 
hypothesise the influence of public corruption on government management quality by 
benchmarking the “black box” idea of management. Third, we explain the research model, 
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methodology and data. Fourth, we present empirical estimates of the impact of public corruption 
on U.S. state governments’ management quality. Fifth, we interpret the regression results. Our 
conclusion provides some policy implications, notifying the most vulnerable sector of 
management to public corruption.
Literature Review
Lack of Study on the Association between Corruption and Management Variables
There are many studies on the effect of corruption on political and economic variables (Liu and 
Mikesell 2014). Public corruption is harmful to investment, economic growth, procurement, 
productivity, income equality, poverty and international trade. ( The association between 
corruption and various political variables such as political institutions, democracy, freedom of 
press, campaign funds, decentralisation and interest groups is controversial, overall (
There exists a general consensus that reducing public corruption is one of the fundamental 
objectives of public administration (Themudo 2014). However, study on the association between 
corruption and the variables of public administration and public management is scarce. To our 
knowledge, only a couple of studies describe some of the implications of corruption on 
governmental organisations. For Felps, Mitchel and Byington (2006), “Bad apples can spoil the 
barrel,” noting some negative impacts of “dysfunctional” members on group processes and 
outcomes of organisations. Jancsics and Javor (2012) also demonstrate a harmful influence of 
corruption on network structures. Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983) argue that corruption 
deteriorates administrative performance by subverting trust, inhibiting innovation and reform, 
encouraging violations of rules and regulations and intimidating honest civil servants into silence.
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We suspect a couple of reasons why studies on the impact of corruption on management 
variables are rare. First, scholars have failed to find a complete definition and a perfect measure of 
public corruption (Collier 1999; Johnston 1994, 1999; Kaufmann 1998; Lancaster and Montinola 
1997). Second, it is not easy to define and measure the important aspects of “management in 
organisations” completely. Management variables incorporate various efforts in organisations 
including the conscious efforts of actors and resources to carry out collective objectives (O’Toole 
2000). Public sector management also includes the comprehensive practice of functions such as 
leading, organising, motivating, planning and strategy making, evaluating effectiveness and 
communicating (Rainey 2009). The public management literature does not provide specific 
theories explaining a seemingly obvious association between corruption and management 
variables. Third, the endogeneity of corruption is a headache of an empirical corruption study.
To address the first problem, we follow suggestions in the corruption literature, i.e. we 
choose the most useful definition of corruption appropriate for our “particular concern and 
disciplinary taste.” Concluding that a further effort to find a complete and universal definition of 
corruption will be futile, many scholars recommend this approach in any corruption study (Collier 
1999; Kaufmann 1998; Lancaster and Montinola 1997; Meier and Holbrook 1992). This paper 
contributes further to the literature by addressing below the other potential problems mentioned.
Determinants of Government Management Quality1
Some scholars define management capacity and certain factors in order to have a better 
understanding of government management (Brown and Potoski 2003; Donahue, Selden, and 
                                                           
1 As in the literature, we do not make a clear distinction between management capacity and management quality but 
use them interchangeably. 
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Ingraham 2000; Ingraham and Donahue 2000; Wise 1997). However, there still remains room for 
further research.
Government management capacity is defined as “government’s intrinsic ability to marshal, 
develop, direct, and control its human, physical, and information capital to support the discharge 
of its policy direction.” It is a government’s ability to place “the right resources in the right places 
at the right time.” It is not one-dimensional quality but embedded in a government’s core 
management functions, such as human resource management, financial management, capital 
management and information technology (Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000; Ingraham and 
Donahue 2000). There are several studies underlining the importance of management in 
understanding government performance. It is necessary to make a government effective because 
it shapes and supports its longer-term performance capabilities (Deller and Rudnicki 1992; 
Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000; Ingraham and Donahue 2000; Sokolow 1981). Government 
programmes tend to be more successful in states with greater capacity (O’Leary and Yandle 2000). 
Meier (1988) argues that bureaucratic capacity is required for good public policy.
The existing literature finds some factors which are assumed to affect the management 
quality of governments. King, Zeckhauser and Kim (2002) examine the relationship between 
management quality and a set of features of U.S. state governments. These features include 
government institutions, political and social environments and business environment. Social 
capital is noted as a key factor affecting the management quality of a state government. The 
importance of social capital to government management is also underlined by other studies (Knack 
2002; Putnam 2000). Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2000) provide a conceptual framework relating 
governance and management. It is a comprehensive model covering environmental factors, client 
characteristics, treatments, structures and managerial roles and actions.  
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Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis
“Dissecting the Black Box of Management”
To explain the impact of public corruption on government management quality, we explore the 
classic “black box” idea of management popularised by Easton (1965). The classical idea 
compares government administrative structures and arrangements to a black box in which various 
inputs and resources are transformed into outputs and outcomes but the processes cannot be seen. 
Scholars “dissected” and “revisited” the black box theory to understand how public management 
influences government activities and performance and what occurs within the box. They assumed 
that public management links inputs and results and government cannot perform effectively if the 
link does not function well (Coggburn and Schneider 2003; Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000; 
Ingraham and Donahue 2000).
Management system linking inputs and results inside the black box comprises various 
subsystems such as financial management, human resource management, information technology 
and capital management. These subsystems are crucial to the quality of management system which 
will affect the accomplishment of the ultimate goals of public policy. Although such subsystems 
have been considered as separate functions, management quality is concerned with the extent to 
which they “are integrated, perform within, and contribute to a holistic management system.” The 
management quality of a government is determined by its ability to integrate these distinct 
subsystems within the context of government management (“the degree of integration”) and make 
them contribute to planned outcomes (“managing for result”). Three key activities affecting 
integration are “the exercise of leadership; the use of information; and the strategic allocation of 
resources” (Ingraham and Donahue 2000).   
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Shedding Light Inside the “Black Box”
As aforementioned, Ingraham and Donahue (2000) “dissect” and “revisit” the black box idea of 
management and help public management students understand what management capacity is, what 
constitutes effective management quality and how management links inputs, outputs and outcomes. 
Still, however, more light can be cast inside the black box of management. This study identifies a 
factor influencing the three key activities affecting integration of management subsystems, i.e. 
leadership, use of information and resource allocation. The factor we suggest is public officials’ 
corruption. Conceptual frameworks explaining how public corruption may affect the three 
activities follow. They will shed light inside the black box of government management.          
Corruption and Leadership: Principal Agent Theory and Public Corruption
The concept of public leadership is broad and multi-dimensional. It encompasses a public leader’s 
ability to define the mission and vision of her agency; to communicate, persuade and motivate 
members so that they may work for the defined values of the organisation; to make decisions 
giving guidance to the agency and its members; to accomplish expected outcomes effectively and 
realise policy makers’ intent; and to coordinate the activities of the public organisation consistent 
with broader public values and the principal’s utility (Ingraham and Donahue 2000). This implies 
that the malfeasance of leaders and ineffective leadership will exert a bad influence upon the 
quality of government management.
We argue that corrupt officials’ behaviours will violate the ideal leadership practices 
defined above. This recalls the classical principal-agent theory of corruption. Public officials are 
agents obliged to work on behalf of the public, the principal, making decisions and implementing 
public policies. The theory assumes that corruption occurs when the agent violates the ideal 
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principal-agent relationship and seeks his own interest at the cost of the principal given information 
asymmetry. Corrupt leaders tend to sacrifice the interest of principals for personal gains (Alam 
1989; Groenendijk 1997; Kliggard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1999). This implies that public 
corruption can deteriorate government accountability and corrupt officials fail to maximise citizens’ 
interests while responding to their personal interests, which, as a consequence, worsens the quality 
of government management. 
Knack (2002) notes that “accountability is meaningful to monitor government and protest 
against incompetence or malfeasance.” Ashforth and Anand (2003) describe effectively how 
leadership can make corruption institutionalised2 within an organisation. Corrupt leaders may 
engage in corruption by acting as role models for organisational members whose decisions and 
behaviours influence other members seriously. They may also “reward, condone, ignore, or 
otherwise facilitate corruption.” Moreover, leaders may play a role in “authorizing” and 
“encouraging” corruption (Ashforth and Anand 2003).
Bureaucratic corruption, so-called “petty corruption”, refers to corrupt behaviours of low-
level public officials. People may experience this corruption through daily administrative services 
from agency bureaucrats, immigration officials, custom clerks, policemen, and the like (Andvig 
and Fjeldstad 2001). It is argued that corrupt officials are likely to make administrative processes 
inefficient, increase red tape and delay procedures in demanding bribes (Jain 2001). Thus, these
cases also verify that corruption can hamper the exercise of leadership.            
                                                           
2 Institutionalisation of corruption is defined as “where an initial corrupt decision or act becomes embedded in 
structures and processes and thereby routinized” (Ashforth and Anand 2003). 
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Hypothesis 1: Public corruption is expected to worsen the quality of government management 
because corrupt officials may fail to meet the accountability standard and conduct ideal leadership 
behaviours. 
Corruption and Use of Information: Transparency, Bureaucracy Model
The issues related to use of information also affect the overall integration of the management 
subsystems (Ingraham and Donahue 2000). They include how freely, consistently and quickly 
managers cause information to flow through a government; how attentively managers handle data 
and information; and how much managers are willing to share knowledge (Ingraham and Donahue 
2000). Thus, misuse of information, malfunction of information technology and ill-intentioned 
application of information will deteriorate the management quality of a government.
To explain corrupt officials’ behaviour related to use of information, we apply the bureau 
information monopoly model, developed by William Niskanen (1971). The two major assumptions 
of this theory are: first, bureaucrats desire maximised budgets because the size of budgets means 
“power, pay, and prestige” to them. Second, bureaucrats have monopolistic information on the 
actual costs of public programmes and projects, compared with other politicians and the public. 
Self-interested bureaucrats are willing to use this information on monopoly power in seeking 
personal gains. The selfishness of bureaucrats tends to make many of their public decisions 
inefficient. For example, they cause public budget size to be elevated artificially and “excessive”, 
which means larger than the “optimal” (Berry and Lowery 1987). 
We define public corruption as “misuse of public office for private gain.” Corrupt 
bureaucrats are likely to pursue selfish interests to the extreme. They can seek personal interests
even by violating laws and regulations, which are called “predatory” and illegal behaviours. If the 
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bureau information monopoly model assumes that the selfishness of common bureaucrats results
in inefficient use of information, we may argue that public corruption, extreme selfishness, will
also make the use of information inefficient, or even worse. 
In addition, corrupt public officials have to hide their malfeasance so as not to be detected 
and punished. Thus, they are less likely to share information transparently, or they have personal 
incentives to distort information for their own benefits, which should result in misuse of 
information and malfunction of information technology (Liu and Mikesell 2014). 
Hypothesis 2: Public corruption is expected to worsen the quality of government management 
because corrupt officials may fail to use information efficiently and transparently in pursuit of 
their personal gain through information.       
Corruption and Resource Allocation: Rent-seeking Model
Efficient resource allocations also promote the integration of the management subsystems, which
is crucial to the maintenance of government management quality (Ingraham and Donahue 2000).
Public officials should make a series of decisions regarding how to collect resources necessary for 
governmental operations, how to allocate public resources to various government projects, and in 
which criteria public resources should be distributed. Regarding this, Ingraham and Donahue 
(2000) identify two fundamental examples of public resource allocation: budgeting process and 
personnel management. Financial resources are allocated through budgeting process. Human 
resources are distributed and located through personnel management. Misallocation and distorted 
allocation of financial and human resources must result in the deterioration of the quality of 
government management. 
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Concerning the impact of public corruption on resource allocation, we apply the “rent-
seeking explanation”. The rent-seeking literature explains that public corruption may distort 
resource allocation, because corrupt officials are more likely to spend public resources on items 
from which they can levy larger bribes or rents. They take advantage of their discretionary power 
on resource allocation for their private gain. In particular, many studies show that public corruption 
distorts resource allocation in budgeting processes such as education, health, defence, 
infrastructure, military and social welfare expenditures (Baraldi 2008; Delavallade 2006; Hessami 
2010; Mauro 1998; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Recently, Liu and Mikesell (2014) found that U.S. 
states with a higher level of corruption are likely to spend more on construction, capital, highways 
and police protection, at the cost of social sector spending such as education, health and hospitals, 
because these items are more “bribe-generating” for corrupt officials. 
Likewise, corruption has a harmful influence on human resource allocation. Biased human 
resource allocations are historical practices of public corruption. Instead of applying the merit-
based standard, corrupt leaders are likely to give positions to those with whom they have personal 
connections. Although they are often interchangeably used, favouritism, clientelism, cronyism, 
nepotism and patrimonialism are all related to the distortionary impact of corruption on human 
resource allocation (Amundsen 1999; Andvig and Fjeldstad 2001; Lancaster and Montinola 1997).         
Hypothesis 3: Public corruption is expected to worsen the quality of government management 
because corrupt officials may distort public allocation of both financial and human resources. 
Corrupt officials are likely to allocate public resources to items from which they can collect higher 
rents.
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Our benchmark hypothesis integrating these sub-hypotheses regarding the association 
between public corruption and government management quality is as follows:
Hypothesis 4: By integrating all three hypotheses above, we expect that states with a higher level 
of public corruption are likely to have a lower overall quality of management. It will happen 
because public corruption will deteriorate the three major activities of government crucial to the 
effective integration of management subsystems and the maintenance of high quality of 
management consequentially: exercise of leadership, use of information and resource allocation.
Data 
Dependent Variable: Management Quality of U.S. State Governments
We use the Government Performance Project (GPP) data to assess the level of management quality 
of the 50 U.S. state governments. The Pew Center on the States and Syracuse University manage 
the data. The management quality data of 50 states are available for 1998, 2000, 2005 and 2008. 
Like all other data sources, the GPP data are not free from critics (Kirlin 2001), but various studies 
have used them. It is alleged that the GPP management quality grades provide “detailed, general, 
criteria that clearly define good management practice” of American states. They represent the “best, 
criteria-based, multidimensional measure” (Borins 2005; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). 
The GPP data make it possible for many public management studies to operationalise theoretical 
concepts systematically and provide practical insights based on empirical evidence (Brudney, 
O’Toole, and Rainey 2000; Burke and Wright 2002; Coggburn and Schneider 2003; Donahue, 
Selden, and Ingraham 2000; Knack 2002; Heckman 2012).  
The GPP data provide letter-grade scales, A to F, on the quality of state governments’ 
management. Grades are available both on their “overall performance” and five specific 
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management areas: financial management, capital management, human resource management, 
managing for results and information technology. The change in subcategories of information, 
people, money and infrastructure in 2005 and 2008 data can present a challenge for comparing the 
subcategory grades over four data sets. However, the Pew Center explains that comparison of the 
“overall” grades should not be of a serious concern3 (Heckman 2012; Pew Center for the States 
2008).This study uses the “overall performance” grades as dependent variables of the regression 
models. We convert the letter-grade scale, A, A-, B+, etc., to a numerical scale. A maximum 
possible value is 12 for an A. A minimum possible value is one for an F. 
Table 1 displays the ranking of 50 states based on the GPP “overall performance” grades 
on average over the period 1998–2008. The most capable states, or those with the best management 
quality over this period, are Utah, Virginia, Washington, Michigan, Missouri, Delaware, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maryland, and Texas. The least capable states, or those with the worst management 
quality, are Oklahoma, Wyoming, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, California, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Alabama. Figure 1 illustrates the ranking of 50 states by a map according to 
management quality over the period 1998–2008 on average. 
(Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here.)
Key Independent Variable: Public Officials’ Corruption
To measure the extent of public corruption of each state, we use Report to Congress on the 
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section (PIS) published by the U.S. Department 
of Justice. The Department reports the number of public officials who are convicted of violations
of the federal corruption-related laws across the states annually. All federal, state and local 
                                                           
3 This was also confirmed by personal communication with N. Johnson, April 22, 2010 (Heckman 2012). 
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governors, legislators, judges and other public employees are subjects of the investigation. Multi-
year panel data of 50 states are available, from which we collect data over the period 1998–2008 
for this study. The data are appropriate because the report defines public corruption as “crimes 
involving abuses of the public trust by government officials”, which is similar to the academic 
definition of corruption – “misuse of public office for private gain” (DOJ 2002). 
Relevance and Validity of the Corruption Variable
We benchmark the methodology used by Liu and Mikesell (2014) to show the relevance and 
validity of our key independent variable, or public corruption in each state. Regarding relevance, 
we argue that the number of convictions should be highly related to the extent of corruption in 
each state. Previous studies using the same data show that the state conviction rankings correspond 
to the general perceptions on government corruption in America (Glaeser and Saks 2006; Meier 
and Holbrook 1992). 
We rank the 50 states according to our indexes of corruption by averaging state corruption 
over the period 1998–2008 (see Table 1). One indicates the number of convictions per 100,000 
population, while the other implies the number of convictions per 10,000 public employees. The 
lower the ranking, the less corruption in the state. According to the first index, or number of 
convictions per 100,000 population, the 10 least corrupt states over the period are Oregon, New 
Hampshire, Nebraska, Colorado, Minnesota, Utah, Iowa, Kansas, Washington and Nevada. The 
10 most corrupt states are North Dakota, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alaska, South Dakota, Kentucky, 
Missouri, Alabama, Illinois, and Montana. Overall, the result corresponds to the ranking from the 
other index, or the number of convictions per 10,000 public employees. Figure 2 illustrates the 
corruption map of states according to our first public corruption index.
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(Insert Figure 2 here)
Related to the validity of the corruption variable, we run multivariate panel regressions of 
the two conviction measures on variables measuring the extent of federal prosecution, law 
enforcement and slackness and court resources. These variables include work hours of U.S. 
attorneys per population (per public employee), number of federal judges per population (per 
public employee), amount of court caseloads per judge and pending rates per judge. None of these 
variables has a statistically significant relationship with the conviction measure. Our conviction 
measures do not reflect simply the extent of judicial resources, U.S. attorneys’ workloads and 
enforcement/slackness. Rather, they reveal the extent of public officials’ corruption in each state.
Advantages of the PIS Data
Previous studies demonstrate some comparative advantages of the conviction measure from the 
PIS data over other available corruption-related indexes (Depken and LaFountain 2006; Glaeser 
and Saks 2006; Meier and Holbrook 1992). First, the PIS data provide consistent conviction 
measures across time and states because the U.S. Department of Justice has applied federal laws 
to all states over the period, not local and state laws. Second, compared with perception-oriented 
corruption indexes, the conviction measures based on the PIS data provide more concrete and 
objective numbers. These perception-oriented corruption indexes tend to be constructed by opinion 
surveys. They are susceptible to the subjective meaning of corruption which is diverse and 
inconsistent across societies and time (Liu and Mikesell 2014). 
Management Quality of Neighbouring State Governments
American states learn from each other and compete with each other in making public policies. This 
variable measures the potential spill-over effects of policy innovations among states. It calculates 
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the average of “overall performance” GPP grades of all neighbouring states. States are considered 
as neighbours if they share borders. For example, the neighbours of the State of Indiana are Illinois, 
Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio. We expect that states surrounded by well-performing states are 
likely to have a higher level of management quality because they learn from nearby successes.  
Social Capital of U.S. States
Popularised by Coleman (1990), social capital received considerable attention as a sociopolitical 
variable affecting policy-related outcomes of governments (Helliwell 2006; Helliwell and Putnam 
2004; Herian et al. 2014; Kawachi et al. 2008). Putnam (1993) defines social capital as “features 
of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated efforts.” We expect that states with high levels of social capital 
perform better because trust, shared norms and networks can help governments govern residents 
in these jurisdictions more efficiently, and who are expected to act in the broader social interest 
(Knack 2002; Putnam 2000).
The social capital of American states can be measured by a number of methods, including 
census response, volunteering, social trust and the extent of participation in good government 
groups4 (Herian et al. 2014; King et al. 2000; Knack 2002; Lochner et al. 1999; Putnam 2000). 
Lochner et al. (1999) find that the indicators of social capital are strongly correlated with each 
other. Due to the strong collinearity between indicators, it is not a good idea to add all the indicators 
in regression equations (Herian et al. 2014). In this paper, we use the census response rate as a 
proxy for social capital of states because its annual values are available historically. Political 
                                                           
4They include groups which are interested in better government such as the League of Women Voters. The 
percentage of survey respondents who have been members is used as a proxy for social capital, which fails to show a 
significant association with state government performance (Knack 2002).  
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scientists explain that people’s cooperation with the census should be viewed as a public good and 
its response rate as a reasonable proxy for social capital measuring citizens’ cooperative attitudes 
which can improve governmental performance (Knack 2002). It is found that there exists a 
statistically-significant association between U.S. state government performance, measured by the 
GPP overall performance grades, and the U.S. Census response rate, or proxy for social capital of 
states (Knack 2002). Compared with other indicators of social capital based on opinion surveys, 
an empirical advantage of the census response rate data is that they provide concrete and objective 
numbers of the extent of social capital.
Annual census response rates are available from the American Community Survey 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The American Community Survey produces demographic, 
housing, social and economic data annually. The data correspond to the traditional census data 
collected every 10 years during the decennial census on a “long form.” According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau , “the proposed design of the American Community Survey will produce annual 
estimates for all states, as well as for all cities, counties, metropolitan areas, and population groups 
of 65,000 or greater” (Griffin et al. 2001). The average sample size of the survey is 2,181,250 over 
the period 2000–20125. 
Personal Income
There are controversial explanations for the impact of personal income on government 
management quality. On the one hand, high-income citizens with higher education are likely to 
demand more efficient government. States with higher-income citizens obtain a larger tax base, 
which means that they may hire more capable employees by offering higher salaries and purchase 
                                                           
5 Calculated by the authors of this paper.
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better equipment to improve their efficiency (Knack 2002). In the present paper, we call this the 
‘wealth-effect’ of personal income. On the other hand, high income citizens may not rely on public 
systems to receive services such as education and security, etc., because they can afford to purchase 
these services privately. This can reduce pressures on state government to operate efficiently
(Knack 2002). Let us call this the ‘substitution effect’ of personal income on government 
management. Also, based on Wagner’s Law, the size of government tends to increase as the 
personal income of residents increases. The size of governments can work as a barrier to efficient 
management. Separating from the ‘wealth-effect’ and ‘substitution effect’, we call this the ‘size 
effect’ of personal income on government management quality.    
Unemployment Rate
The economic environment will affect the overall operation of a state government. Good economy 
implies the increase of tax revenue, which can be used as resources by state governments. A 
climate of entrepreneurship and lively economy tend to be a force for effective government (King 
et al. 2002). We use unemployment rates as proxy for states’ economy. We expect a negative 
relationship between unemployment rates and state governments’ management quality.    
Governor’s Institutional Power
The governor is the most powerful political player in a state, and who influences the efficiency 
and management of the state government. Governor’s institutional power and influence vary across 
the states. We expect that the extent of governor’s institutional power should be associated 
positively with government management quality in general. However, we also have to consider 
the possibility that a governor’s political power could be detrimental to the efficient and lively 
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operation of the government through excessive controls over bureaucracy and unfair patronage 
(King et al. 2002). 
We use Beyle’s (1992) index of “Gubernatorial Institutional Power” to measure governors’ 
institutional power. He considered three factors to construct the ratings: “a governor’s budgetary 
power, appointive power, and whether a governor’s cabinet is separately elected” (Beyle 1992). 
Beyle measured the three characteristics on a 1 to 5 scale separately. The three separate ratings are 
combined to construct the score of a governor’s institutional power in a 0 to 1 scale6. The higher 
the ratings, the stronger the gubernatorial power.
Political Competition
Political competition means polarised preferences and interests among state politicians. Political 
support and cooperation from politicians and lawmakers are crucial to efficient management of 
state governments. Fierce competition among politicians in a state can work like “gridlock” in the 
state government. On the other hand, healthy and productive political competition can make state 
government more accountable. Whether the influence of political competition on government 
management is either positive or negative is an empirical issue (Knack 2002).
We benchmark Clingermayer and Wood (1995) to measure the extent of political 
competition in the states. They suggest that “1 minus the absolute value of the average annual 
proportionate partisan majority in the chambers of the state legislature.” The higher a value, the 
more politically-split a government.
                                                           
6 Beyle (1992) uses principal factors analysis with Varimax rotation. A unique factor is identified with each 
characteristic: 0.338 for budgetary power, 0.459 for appointment power and 0.508 for separately elected teams 
(King et al. 2002).  
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Government Ideology and Citizen Ideology
Political scientists generally assume that Republicans were associated with progressive reforms in 
state and local governments historically, while Democrats were more inclined to patronage, 
especially in the South, which made government operation inefficient (Knack 2002). We use the 
indexes of a state government’s political ideology and citizens’ political ideology constructed by 
Berry et al. (1998). Both scores range from 0 to 100. A value of zero means that political ideology 
in the state is extremely conservative but a value of 100 extremely liberal. 
Ethnic Diversity 
Similar to political competition, polarised preferences and interests due to racial heterogeneity can 
make governing more difficult (Knack 2002). Ethnic diversity can be measured by Hirshman-
Herfindal Index: 
Ethnic Diversity =
1 − ∑   
  
   
1 − (
100%
  )
(1)
where, Ri: share of ith component out of n types of ethnicity based on the classification by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. The larger a value, the more heterogeneous a racial composition in the state. We 
expect a negative association between ethnic diversity and government management quality.
Table 3 demonstrates how we measure all the variables, what we expected on the sign of 
the regressors in our benchmark regression model and where the data were collected.
(Insert Table 3 here)
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Empirical Model and Methodology
Econometric Model
Our econometric model explaining the impact of public officials’ corruption on management 
quality of state governments is as follows:
Government Management Quality  = f(Public Corruption; Management Quality of Neighboring 
States; Personal Income per Capita; Unemployment Rate; Government Ideology; Citizen Ideology; 
Political Competition; Social Trust; Governor’s Institutional Power; Ethnic Diversity; Year 
Dummies).
Table 4 demonstrates the descriptive statistics of the variables.
(Insert Table 4 here)
The regression equation is as follows: 
(GPP Ratings) ,  = α (Corruption) ,  + X , 
  β + μ  + v ,  (2)
where (GPP Ratings)i,t is state i’s “overall performance” score from the Government Performance 
Project in year t (1998, 2000, 2005 and 2008), and (Corruption)i,t is the extent of public officials’ 
corruption in state i at year t. We apply two measures of public corruption in this study; the number 
of convictions per 100,000 population and the number of convictions per 10,000 public employees 
including all federal, state and local public officials7.   , 
  is a column vector of explanatory 
variables controlling for the management quality of neighbouring states on average, personal 
                                                           
7 Both indexes come with consistent regression results. Following previous studies, our benchmark regression model 
uses the number of convictions per 100,000 population.
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income, unemployment rate, political ideology of government and citizen, political competition, 
social trust, governor’s institutional power, ethnic diversity and year dummies. β is a vector of 
coefficients.    and   ,  represent unobserved state fixed effects and idiosyncratic errors, 
respectively. Subscripts i and t index state and year, respectively.
The Benchmark Model: Ordered Outcome Logit Regression 
We use an ordered logit model with robust standard errors as the benchmark model of this study 
because the dependent variable, the GPP ratings of state government management quality, is 
ordered from F to A. The following explains the benchmark model and uses notations used by 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010, 527–29). 
The ordered outcomes, noted y here, arise sequentially as a latent variable, y*, crosses 
increasingly higher thresholds. In this study, y* is an unobserved value of management quality of 
state governments determining the letter grade of management quality, or y. Different from y*, y
means an observed measure of government management quality from the GPP ratings. For 
individual state i, we specify
y 
∗ = x 
 γ + u  (3)
For a q-alternative ordered model, we define 
y  = p if α    < y 
∗ ≤ α , p = 1,… , q (4)
Where α  = −∞ and α  = ∞. Then
Pr (y  = p) = Pr (α    < y 
∗ ≤ α ) = F (α  − x 
 γ) − F (α    − x 
 γ) (5)
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where F(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of ui which is logistically distributed with F(z) 
= ez / (1+ez). The (q-1) threshold parameters, α1, … , αq-1, are obtained by maximising the log-
likelihood function. The regression parameters, γ, are also obtained by maximising the log 
likelihood function. The sign of the regression parameters can be interpreted as determining 
whether the latent variable y*, not y, increases with the regressors. 
The interpretation of coefficients of regressors is as follows. If βk is negative, this means 
that an increase in xik, or kth regressor of ith state, necessarily increases the probability of being in 
the lowest category of the dependent variable and decreases the probability of being in the highest 
category of the dependent variable. Note that the parameters of ordered outcome model are 
generally not directly interpretable from the coefficients. Instead, we should compute marginal 
effects (MEs) of each regressor. The ME on the probability of choosing alternative l when 
regressor xk changes is given by 
ME    =
∂Pr(y  = l)
∂x  
= {F (α    − x 
 γ) − F′(α  − x 
 γ)}β  (6)
It implies that a one-unit change in kth regressor will increase/decrease by MEkil the probability 
that management quality of state i, or yi, may be equal to l.
Empirical Findings 
Table 5 displays the empirical results. Model I is our benchmark model. Since the dependent 
variable, or “overall performance” scores of the GPP data, is ordinal, the ordered logit estimation 
with robust standard errors is chosen as our benchmark regression model. The ordered logit model 
estimates the parameters through maximum likelihood method. In sum, the statistically significant 
determinants of U.S. state governments’ management quality are public corruption, personal 
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income and governor’s institutional power, which is consistent with the hypothesis and previous 
research on government management.
(Insert Table 5 here)
Public Corruption on Management Quality
Model I of table 5 shows that public officials’ corruption is one of the statistically significant 
determinants of the management quality of U.S. state governments. The coefficient of public 
corruption is negative (= -1.24) and statistically-significant at 1% significance level. The 
significantly-negative coefficient of corruption variable implies that increase in public corruption 
necessarily increases the probability of being in the lowest outcome of government management 
quality and decreases the probability of being in the highest category of government management 
quality. As expected in the hypothesis, state governments’ management quality is likely to get 
aggravated in states with a higher level of corruption. 
The parameters of ordered logit models are generally not directly interpretable (Cameron
and Trivedi 2010). Instead, we compute marginal effects, MEs. First, we obtain seven predicted 
probabilities because there are seven alternatives outcomes given the regression results. Table 6 
displays the predicted probabilities of all outcomes from 1 to 7. Based on their mean probabilities, 
we assume that the three outcomes from the highest, or when outcomes are 5, 6 and 7, indicate 
state governments ranked the highest management quality. We compute the average predicted 
probability of all outcomes from 1 to 7 case by case. 
(Insert Table 6 here)
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Second, table 7 displays the marginal effects of determinants for only the best management 
quality outcome cases (when outcomes = 5, 6 and 7). Model I, II and III demonstrate the marginal 
effects of the regressors on management quality of state governments when the outcomes of 
management quality are equal to 7, 6 and 5, respectively. 
(Insert Table 7 here)
The marginal effects of all regressors on management quality of state governments show 
consistent results with those of table 5 showing only estimates of regressor coefficients. Table 7 
reads as follows. A one-unit increase in public corruption decreases by 0.06 the probability (6%)
that state governments’ management quality may be the highest (Model I). A one-unit increase in 
public corruption decreases by 0.102 (10.2%) the probability that state governments’ management 
quality may be the second highest (Model II). A one-unit increase in public corruption decreases 
by 0.076 (7.6%) the probability that state governments’ management quality may be the third 
highest (Model III). On average, a one-unit increase in public corruption decreases by 0.079 (7.9%)
the probability that state governments’ management quality may be the most capable.
Personal Income
Model I of table 5 shows that personal income is also one of the statistically significant 
determinants of the management quality of U.S. state governments. The coefficient of personal 
income is negative (= -2.262) and statistically-significant at 1% significance level. The 
significantly-negative coefficient of personal income variable implies that increase in personal 
income necessarily increases the probability of being in the lowest outcome of government
management quality and decreases the probability of being in the highest category of government 
management quality. We expected controversial impacts of personal income on government 
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management quality, i.e. ‘wealth-effect’, ‘substitution-effect’ and ‘size-effect.’ The empirical 
evidence suggests that the association between personal income and management quality is 
negative, which supports the substitution effect or size effect. An affluent state in which citizens 
are able to find private substitutes for public services easily is less likely to face strong pressure to 
operate efficiently. It can be also explained that increase of size of government may hamper 
efficient management of government.
Table 7 shows that a one-unit increase in the natural log of personal income decreases by 
0.11 the probability (11%) that state governments’ management quality may be the highest (Model 
1). A one-unit increase in public corruption decreases by 0.186 (18%) the probability that state 
governments’ management quality may be the second highest (Model II). A one-unit increase in 
public corruption decreases by 0.14 (14%) the probability that state governments’ management 
quality may be the third highest (Model III). On average, a one-unit increase in personal income 
variable decreases by 0.145 (14.59%) the probability that state governments’ management quality 
may be the most capable.
Governor’s Institutional Power
Model I of table 5 shows that governor’s institutional power is the other statistically significant 
determinant of the management quality of state governments. The coefficient of governor’s 
institutional power is positive (= 2.034) and statistically-significant at 1% significance level. The 
significantly-positive coefficient of governor’s institutional power variable indicates that increase 
in gubernatorial power necessarily increases the probability of being in the highest outcome of 
government management quality and decreases the probability of being in the lowest category of 
government management quality. This result is consistent with our expectation that the governor 
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is the most influential political player in a state whose institutional power should be crucial to 
efficient management of the state government.  
Table 7 shows that a one-unit increase in governor power variable increases by 0.099 the 
probability (9.9%) that state governments’ management quality may be the highest (Model I). A 
one-unit increase in governor power variable increases by 0.167 (16.7%) the probability that state 
governments’ management quality may be the second highest (Model II). A one-unit increase in 
governor power variable increases by 0.126 (12.6%) the probability that state governments’ 
management quality may be the third highest (Model III). On average, a one-unit increase in 
gubernatorial power variable increases by 0.13 (13%) the probability that state governments’ 
management quality may be the most capable.
Other Determinants
Table 5 also demonstrates the association between state government management quality and other 
determinants. They include unemployment rate, government ideology, citizen ideology, political 
competition, social trust and ethnic diversity. Different from public corruption, personal income 
and governor’s institutional power, the impacts of these variables on state government
management quality are not statistically significant. However, the signs of the regressors are 
coherent with our expectations and results from the existing literature (King et al. 2002; Knack 
2002; Moynihan and Ingraham 2003).
Robustness of the Benchmark Model and Regression Results
To check the robustness of our regression model and empirical results, we apply three strategies. 
First, we measure the extent of public corruption in each state by an alternative method, or the 
number of convictions per 10,000 public employees, instead of the number of convictions per 
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100,000 population. Second, we estimate the regressors by using pooled panel estimation methods, 
instead of ordered logit estimation. Third, we use two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
(2SLS-IV) regressions to correct for potential endogeneity of the corruption variable.
Number of Convictions per 10,000 Public Employees
Model II in table 5 displays the empirical results when we measure the public corruption of each 
state by the number of convictions per 10,000 public employees. We consider the possible 
argument that the extent of public officials’ corruption across states should be compared based on 
the size of public employees, not on the size of population. Even after we apply this alternative 
measurement of corruption, however, the regression results do not change substantially. Consistent 
with the result of Model I in table 5, public corruption (negative coefficient, 5% significance level), 
personal income (negative coefficient, 1% significance level) and governor’s institutional power 
(positive coefficient, 1% significance level) are the statistically-significant determinants of state 
government management quality. In sum, the significantly-negative coefficients of corruption 
variable and personal income means that increase in public corruption and personal income 
necessarily increases the probability of being in the lowest management quality of state 
governments and decreases the probability of being in the highest management quality of state 
governments. In contrast, the significantly-positive coefficient of governor’s institutional power 
variable implies that increase in gubernatorial power necessarily increases the probability of being 
in the highest management quality and decreases the probability of being in the lowest 
management quality8. 
                                                           
8 The marginal effects (MEs) of the regressors are consistent with those of the benchmark model shown in Table 7,
which are not reported here.
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Pooled Panel Estimations
We estimate the regressors by using two pooled panel regressions instead of ordered logit 
regression like the benchmark model. Model III in Table 5 uses the number of convictions per 
100,000 population as corruption variable. Model IV in Table 5 uses the number of convictions 
per 10,000 public employees. Both regressions use robust standard errors. Since the within 
variations of “overall performance” scores of the GPP data, or our dependent variable, do not vary 
sufficiently, we use pooled panel regressions rather than fixed effect estimations following the 
recommendation of the statistical package. Model III and IV also show consistent results with 
those of Model I. Public officials’ corruption (negative), personal income (negative) and 
governor’s institutional power (positive) are the statistically-significant determinants of U.S. state 
governments’ management quality.    
Two-stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Regression
A reliable study on corruption should address concerns of endogeneity. To deal with such a
problem, we use the efficient two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) estimation. 
We reiterate, at this point, our regression equation again:
(GPP Ratings) ,  = α (Corruption) ,  + X , 
  β + μ  + v ,  (2)
In this equation, our key independent variable, (          ) , , is assumed to be endogenous with
the error term, εit =(   +   ,  ). We deal with this problem using valid instruments of public 
corruption. Some potential valid instrumental variables of public corruption should be correlated 
with the current value of corruption, but not with the current error term. 
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We suggest two first-lead variables of U.S. Attorneys’ work hours per population and 
number of federal judges per population as instruments of the current extent of corruption. In other 
words, state i’s public corruption at time t, (Corruption)i,t, is instrumented by U.S. attorneys’ work 
hours per population and number of federal judges per population of state i at time (t+1), not t. 
They proxy for some potential future change in judiciary system of states at time (t+1). 
The logic supporting the instruments is that states facing a higher occurrence of public 
corruption in the current year are likely to increase the extent of detection and punishment in the 
future year to reduce public corruption, which implies that the current level of corruption should 
be correlated with some variables measuring the change in judiciary system in the future year. 
However, we do not expect that any potential change in judiciary system in the future year will be 
associated with the current error term of the regression equation, εit =(   +   , ), at equation (2) 
above.          
For a specified instrumental variable regression, we have to check a couple of tests. They 
are endogeneity, overidentifying and weak-instrument tests. First, table 8 shows that our corruption
variable is endogenous as we expect. The null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected both by Durbin 
and Wu-Hausman test at 0.1% significance level. 
(Insert Table 8 here)
Second, table 9 demonstrates the test results of overidentifying restrictions. We check this 
because we use two instrumenting variables for an instrumented variable. The null hypothesis 
implies that all instruments are valid. Both Sargan test and Basman test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis at the conventional significance levels (1%, 5%, and 10%), which implies the 
overidentifying restriction is valid.
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(Insert Table 9 here)
Third, we check the weak instrument tests. Table 10 displays first-stage regression 
summary statistics. Note that F statistic, or 12.549, is greater than the rule of thumb value of 10 
that is sometimes suggested to check the weakness of instruments. Thus, our instruments do not 
seem to be weak (Cameron and Trivedi 2010, 198). In addition, the first stage regression results 
show that the association between corruption variable and our instrumenting variables are 
statistically significant at the conventional significance levels, shown in Table 11. 
(Insert Table 10 here)
We use a two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression (2SLS-IV) to handle the 
potential endogenity problem of our key independent variable, public corruption. The 2SLS-IV 
estimator is assumed to be efficient compared with other estimators. In sum, note that our 
instrumental variable regression satisfies all the tests of endogeneity, overidentification and weak 
instruments as proven above. 
Table 11 shows the 2SLS-IV regression results. They are consistent with those of the 
benchmark model, or Model I in table 5 and Model 1 in table 7. Statistically-significant 
determinants of state government management quality are public corruption, personal income, 
citizen’s political ideology and governor’s institutional power. States with a higher level of public 
corruption, personal income and citizen’s political ideology are likely to manage their governments 
less efficiently, compared with states where these variables are evident to a lower extent. On the 
contrary, states whose gubernatorial institutional power is stronger tend to manage their 
government more efficiently. 
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All these prove that the regression results of our benchmark model are consistent and robust. 
They also match with the proposed hypothesis.
(Insert Table 11 here)
Conclusion and Policy Implication
Despite a consensus on the significance of public corruption in public management and public 
administration, the impact of public officials’ corruption on the management quality of the U.S. 
state governments has not been investigated. To explain the potential harmful impact of public 
corruption on government management quality, we began our discussion from the classical “black 
box” idea of management. Government management links inputs and results, but the processes are 
not seen fully. Scholars “dissect” and “revisit” this idea and find that government management 
quality is determined by the integration of management subsystems such as human resource 
management, financial management, capital management and information technology. They also 
note that three key activities affect the integration of these management subsystems, which are the 
exercise of leadership, use of information and resource allocation (Ingraham and Donahue 2000). 
Here, we presented a context within which we could hypothesise the impact of public corruption
on government management quality. 
This study cast light inside the “black box” of government management by showing how 
public corruption affects government management quality. We hypothesised that state public 
officials’ corruption deteriorates the management quality of state governments because public 
corruption can worsen the three key activities of governments and impede ideal integration of 
management subsystems. Corruption means the “misuse [of] public office for private gain.”
Corrupt officials may fail to meet the accountability standard and conduct ideal leadership 
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behaviours. They may also take advantage of information monopoly power in pursuit of private 
interests, which hampers effective and transparent use of information, and distort public resource 
allocation because they are likely to distribute resources on items from which they can collect 
higher rents. To support our arguments, we adopted principal-agent theory, bureau information 
monopoly theory and rent-seeking theory, which have received substantial recognition in the
literature.
Empirical results support our arguments. The probability that a state will maintain the 
highest management quality will decrease if the state suffers from a higher degree of corruption 
among its public officials. We show that our model and empirical results are robust through 
multiple rigorous methods including efficient two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-
IV) regressions.
The policy implication of this study is clear. Corruption is harmful on government 
management quality, which results in the deterioration of policy performance. We noted that the
ultimate goal of this study is to find determinants enhancing government performance. The 
literature finds that government management quality affects policy performance and programme
outcomes (Coggburn and Schnider 2003; Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham 2001; Lynn, Heinrich, 
and Hill 2000). Thus, there might exist a vicious domino effect in terms of public corruption, 
government management and policy performance. Policy makers should pay close attention to the 
behaviours of public officials so that they do not use their public office for private gain. The 
principal-agent theory suggests that governments should create an incentive structure in which the 
negative payoffs of corruption are higher than the returns (Jancsics and Jávor 2012; Rothsetein 
2011). This will work to promote the outcomes and performance of government programmes and 
projects.
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Which management sector is most vulnerable to public corruption among subsystems of 
government management? We argue that infrastructure management is the most vulnerable sector. 
The Government Performance Project changed subcategories of ratings from financial 
management, capital management, human resources, managing for results and information 
technology to information, people, money and infrastructure. Applying our benchmark model and 
two-stage least squares instrumental variable model, we found a statistically-significant negative 
association between public corruption and infrastructure management (see table 12).
(Insert Table 12 here)
The result is consistent with literature on misallocation of public resources due to 
corruption (Kenny 2007; Mauro 2004; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). In particular, a recent study 
showed that the U.S. state governments with a higher degree of corruption are likely to spend their 
resources more on construction, infrastructure and highways, because corrupt officials can levy 
higher bribes on these items (Liu and Mikesell 2014). Policy makers’ special attention on the items 
vulnerable to corruption is required. Infrastructure management is one of the items which require 
special attention. From this perspective, the new categorisation of ratings by the GPP will help 
policy makers to supervise the corruption-prone sectors. 
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Appendix
Table 1. Ranking of U. S. States (on Average, 1998-2008)
Management Quality (GPP), Corruption per Population, Corruption per Public Employee
Ranking Management Capacity (GPP) Ranking Corruption (Population) Corruption (Employee)
1 Utah 1 Oregon Nebraska
2 Virginia 2 New Hampshire Oregon
2 Washington 3 Nebraska New Hampshire
3 Michigan 4 Colorado Minnesota
4 Missouri 5 Minnesota Iowa
5 Delaware 6 Utah Colorado
6 Iowa 7 Iowa Utah
6 Kentucky 8 Kansas Kansas
6 Maryland 9 Washington Washington
6 Texas 10 Nevada Wisconsin
7 Minnesota 11 Wisconsin North Carolina
7 Pennsylvania 12 North Carolina Vermont
7 South Carolina 13 Michigan New Mexico
8 Nebraska 14 Indiana Wyoming
8 Ohio 15 New Mexico Michigan
8 Georgia 16 Vermont Nevada
8 Kansas 17 South Carolina Indiana
8 Louisiana 18 Arkansas Arkansas
9 North Carolina 19 Arizona South Carolina
9 Vermont 20 California Idaho
9 Wisconsin 21 Rhode Island Maine
10 North Dakota 22 Idaho Georgia
11 Florida 23 Maryland Arizona
11 Indiana 24 Connecticut Texas
11 Tennessee 25 Maine California
12 Arizona 26 Texas Connecticut
12 Idaho 27 Georgia Oklahoma
12 Illinois 28 Massachusetts Rhode Island
12 New Jersey 29 Oklahoma Maryland
12 South Dakota 30 Wyoming Massachusetts
13 Montana 31 West Virginia West Virginia
13 Oregon 32 Virginia Virginia
14 Colorado 33 Pennsylvania New York
14 Maine 34 Tennessee Hawaii
14 Massachusetts 35 New York Montana
14 Mississippi 36 Hawaii New Jersey
14 Nevada 37 New Jersey Tennessee
14 New York 38 Ohio Alaska
15 Connecticut 39 Florida Ohio
15 New Mexico 40 Delaware Delaware
15 West Virginia 41 Montana Alabama
16 Oklahoma 42 Illinois Pennsylvania
16 Wyoming 43 Alabama South Dakota
17 Alaska 44 Missouri Missouri
18 Arkansas 45 Kentucky Illinois
47
18 Hawaii 46 South Dakota Florida
19 California 47 Alaska Kentucky
19 New Hampshire 48 Mississippi North Dakota
19 Rhode Island 49 Louisiana Mississippi
20 Alabama 50 North Dakota Louisiana
Sources: Government Performance Project’s Grading the States (1998, 2000, 2005, and 2008 reports), U.S. 
Department of Justice, Reports to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section (1998-
2008)  
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Figure 1. Ranking of States: Management Quality, 1998-2008 on Average GPP
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Figure 2. Ranking of States: Corruption, 1998-2008 on Average Convictions per 100,000 Populations
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Table 2. Judicial Resources and Corruption Convictions
Panel Data Fixed Effect Model with Robust Errors, 1998-2008
Variables
Dependent Variables
Corruption 
(per Population)
Corruption 
(per Public Employee)
Ln(Caseloads per Judge) 0.05 (0.208) 0.118 (0.29)
Ln(Pending Rate per Judge) -0.069 (0.151) -0.188 (0.191)
Attorneys' Work Hours (per Population) 0.208 (0.164)
Number of Judges (per Population) -0.35 (1.051)
Attorneys' Work Hours (per Employee) 0.171 (0.12)
Number of Judges (per Employee) -0.076 (0.09)
Constant 0.267 (0.923) 0.879 (1.303)
Year Dummies included included
Observations 196 198
Robust errors in parentheses.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 3. Determinants of Government Management Quality
Variables Measurement Data Source
Public 
Corruption 
1) (number of convictions of public officials / number of state 
population)*100,000;
2) (number of convictions of public officials / number of public 
employees)*10,000
U.S. Department of 
Justice, Report to 
Congress on the 
Activities and 
Operations of the 
Public Integrity 
Section
Management 
Quality of 
Neighboring 
States
Average of neighboring states' "overall performance" scores Government 
Performance Project, 
the Pew Center of the 
States, Syracuse 
University
Social Capital States’ response rate to the American Community Survey by the U.S. 
Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau, 
American 
Community Survey
ln(Personal 
Income)
Natural log of real per capita personal income U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis
Unemployment 
Rate
States' unemployment rate in percentage U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics
Governor's 
Institutional 
Power
Measures governor's budgetary power, appointive power, and whether 
a governor's cabinet is separately elected. Use principal factors analysis 
with Varimax rotation. A unique factor is identified to each 
characteristic: 0.338 for budgetary power, 0.459 for appointment 
power, and 0.508 for separately elected teams 
Beyle (1992) and 
updated data
Political 
Competition
1 minus the absolute value of the average annual proportionate partisan 
majority in the chambers of the state legislature
National Conference 
of State Legislature 
(NCSL)
Government 
Ideology
GOVTIDEOs,t = (.25)[(POW:DEM:LOWs,t)(ID:DEM:LOWs,t) + 
                           (POW:REP:LOWs,t)(ID:REP:LOWs,t)] +
                           (.25)[(POW:DEM:UPPs,t)(ID:DEM:UPPs,t) +
                           (POW:REP:UPPs,t)(ID:REP:UPPs,t)] + 
                           (.50)[ID:GOVs,t],
where GOVTIDEOs,t is the overall ideology of government in state s in 
year t. (POW:DEM:LOWs,t), (POW:REP:LOWs,t), 
(POW:DEM:UPPs,t), and (POW:REP:UPPs,t) are the Democrats’ and 
Republicans’ proportions power within a state’s lower and upper 
chambers, respectively (the proportions sum to 1 in each chamber). 
(ID:DEM:LOWs,t), (ID:REP:LOWs,t), (ID:DEM:UPs,t), and 
(ID:REP:UPPs,t) are the average ideology scores of Democrats and 
Republicans in a state’s lower and upper chambers, respectively. 
(ID:GOVs,t) is the governor’s ideology, equal to the average ideology 
score of all members of the state legislature in the governor’s party.
Berry et al. (1998). 
Updated data 
provided directly 
from Evan Ringquist.
Citizen 
Ideology
CITIDEOd,t = (INCSUPPd,t)(INCIDEOd,t) +
                       (CHALSUPPd,t)(CHALIDEOd,t),
where CITIDEOd,t means citizen ideology in district d at year t. 
INCSUPPd,t is the share of the electorate at year t supporting district 
d’s incumbent, and CHALSUPP is the share of the electorate 
supporting the challenger. INCIDEOd,t is the ideology score for district 
d’s incumbent at year t, and CHALIDEO is the ideology score for the 
challenger.
Berry et al. (1998). 
Updated data 
provided directly 
from Evan Ringquist.
Ethnic Diversity Hirshman-Herfindal index U.S. Census Bureau
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: Determinants of Government Management Capacity, 1998-2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Management 
Quality(“Overall 
Performance” ratings of the 
GPP data)
overall 7.865 1.587 3.000 11.000 N =     200
between 1.426 5.000 11.000 n =      50
within 0.719 5.865 9.865 T =       4
Corruption overall 0.331 0.298 0.000 2.548 N =     793
(per Population) between 0.178 0.086 0.842 n =      50
within 0.241 -0.512 2.242 T-bar =   15.86
Corruption overall 0.491 0.403 0.000 2.732 N =     795
(per Public Employee) between 0.244 0.126 1.095 n =      50
within 0.322 -0.411 2.509 T-bar =    15.9
Neighboring States' overall 7.870 0.875 4.000 9.800 N =     200
Management between 0.769 5.750 9.400 n =      50
Capacity within 0.428 6.120 9.620 T =       4
Ln(Personal Income) overall 6.081 0.353 5.293 7.004 N =     800
between 0.341 5.453 6.845 n =      50
within 0.104 5.828 6.397 T =      16
Unemployment Rate overall 4.887 1.236 2.300 10.400 N =     800
between 0.868 3.063 6.856 n =      50
within 0.888 2.606 9.056 T =      16
Government Ideology overall 48.303 26.884 0.000 98.125 N =     800
between 19.924 7.078 86.133 n =      50
within 18.255 -0.143 102.824 T =      16
Citizen Ideology overall 49.974 15.599 8.450 95.972 N =     800
between 14.162 25.457 80.115 n =      50
within 6.820 24.440 76.170 T =      16
Political Competition overall 0.341 0.120 0.000 0.500 N =     800
between 0.032 0.245 0.384 n =      50
within 0.115 -0.043 0.572 T =      16
Social Trust overall 97.298 1.510 91.600 99.400 N =     200
(Census Response Rate) between 0.945 94.975 98.725 n =      50
within 1.184 93.273 99.423 T =       4
Governor's overall 3.458 0.424 2.500 4.300 N =     250
Institutional Power between 0.395 2.660 4.120 n =      50
within 0.160 2.778 4.098 T =       5
Ethnic Diversity overall 0.235 0.135 0.012 0.715 N =     800
between 0.035 0.157 0.313 n =      50
within 0.131 -0.007 0.654 T =      16
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Table 5. Impact of Public Corruption on U.S. State Governments’ Management Quality
I II III IV
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Corruption (per Population) -1.235** -0.846**
(0.457) (0.304)
Corruption (per Public Employee) -0.909* -0.599*
(0.458) (0.299)
Neighbors' Management Quality -0.036 -0.021 -0.017 -0.010
(0.21) (0.206) (0.176) (0.175)
Ln(Personal Income) -2.262** -2.127** -1.510** -1.442**
(0.747) (0.745) (0.467) (0.470)
Unemployment Rate -0.120 -0.147 -0.151 -0.164
(0.272) (0.281) (0.177) (0.181)
Government Ideology -0.0002 0.002 0.0008 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Citizen Ideology -0.024 -0.025 -0.020 -0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Political Competition -3.400 -3.160 -2.078 -2.046
(1.925) (1.873) (1.350) (1.331)
Social Trust -0.166 -0.136 -0.161 -0.135
(0.162) (0.167) (0.127) (0.130)
Governor's Institutional Power 2.034** 1.986** 1.278** 1.295**
(0.747) (0.719) (0.408) (0.400)
Ethnic Diversity -0.834 -0.910 -0.214 -0.313
(1.741) (1.748) (1.123) (1.236)
Constant 31.639* 28.543
(14.62) (14.841)
Year Dummies 
(1998, 2000, 2005, 2008)
included included Included Included
Log-likelihood -160.482 -164.977
Wald Chi2 (11) 29.84 23.06
Prob. > Chi2 0.002 0.017
F-value 3.6 2.65
Prob. > F-value 0.001 0.006
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 6. Predicted Probability of Each Outcome of Management Quality
Predicted Probability Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Outcome=1 (Lowest Management Quality) 0.030 0.040 0.001 0.276
Outcome=2 0.127 0.104 0.007 0.460
Outcome=3 0.283 0.098 0.034 0.410
Outcome=4 0.197 0.049 0.036 0.240
Outcome=5 0.180 0.073 0.015 0.267
Outcome=6 0.128 0.083 0.006 0.354
Outcome=7 (Highest Management Quality) 0.055 0.057 0.002 0.394
Table 7. Marginal Effects (MEs) of Corruption on Management Quality
Highest Management Quality Outcomes (Outcome= 7, 6, and 5)
I II III
Outcome = 7 Outcome = 6 Outcome = 5
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Corruption (per Population) -0.060 -0.102* -0.076*
(0.032) (0.043) (0.030)
Neighbors' Management Quality -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.010) (0.017) (0.013)
Ln(Personal Income) -0.110 -0.186** -0.140**
(0.058) (0.065) (0.046)
Unemployment Rate -0.006 -0.010 -0.007
(0.014) (0.023) (0.017)
Government Ideology -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Citizen Ideology -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Political Competition -0.165 -0.279 -0.210
(0.107) (0.160) (0.125)
Social Trust -0.008 -0.014 -0.010
(0.009) (0.014) (0.010)
Governor's Institutional Power 0.099 0.167* 0.126**
(0.052) (0.066) (0.042)
Ethnic Diversity -0.041 -0.069 -0.052
(0.085) (0.142) (0.105)
Year Dummies included included included
p* < .05; p** < .01; p*** < .001 
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses
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Table 8. Tests of Endogeneity of Corruption
Ho: Variables are exogenous
Durbin (score) Chi2 (1) = 16.437 (p=0.0001)
Wu-Hausman F(1, 85) = 17.129 (p=0.0001)
Table 9. Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions
Ho: All instruments are valid
Sargan (score) chi2(1) = 0.208  (p = 0.649)
Basmann chi2(1) = 0.180  (p = 0.671)
Table 10. First-stage Regression Summary Statistics
Variable R-square Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2, 85) Prob. > F
Corruption per 
100,000 populations 0.307 0.210 0.228 12.549 0.000
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Table 11. 2SLS-IV Regression of State Government Management Quality
First Stage Regressions 2SLS-IV Regression
F (12, 85): 3.14 Wald Chi2 (11): 28.090
Prob. > F: 0.001 Prob. > Chi2: 0.003
R-squared: 0.307 Root MSE: 1.634
Adjusted R-sq.: 0.210
Root MSE: 0.326
Dependent Variable
Corruption
(per Pop.) Dependent Variable
Management
Quality
Neighbors' 
Management Quality
0.032 Corruption 
(per Population)
-3.693***
(0.046) (1.001)
Ln(Personal Income) 0.050 Neighbors' 
Management Quality
-0.016
(0.115) (0.229)
Unemployment Rate 0.050 Ln(Personal Income) -1.685**
(0.037) (0.564)
Government Ideology 0.0006 Unemployment Rate -0.054
(0.002) (0.187)
Citizen Ideology -0.004 Government Ideology 0.002
(0.003) (0.008)
Political Competition -0.066 Citizen Ideology -0.034*
(0.328) (0.016)
Social Trust -0.052 Political Competition -1.638
(0.032) (1.637)
Governor's Institutional 
Power
0.059 Social Trust -0.333
(0.095) (0.172)
Ethnic Diversity -0.215 Governor's Institutional Power 1.529**
(0..258) (0.483)
Attorneys' Work Hours 0.224** Ethnic Diversity -1.077
per Population (next year) (0.082) (1.312)
Number of Federal Judges 0.848* Constant 49.964**
per Population (next year) (0.388) (19.019)
Year Dummies Included
Constant 4.190
(3.608)
Year Dummies Included
Instrumented: Corruption per 100,000 populations
Instruments: Neighbors' management quality, log of personal income, unemployment rate, 
government ideology, citizen ideology, political competition, social trust, social trust, 
governor's institutional power, ethnic diversity, year dummies, future value of U.S. Attorneys' 
work hours per population, and future value of number of federal judges per population
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12. Impact of Public Corruption on Infrastructure Management
I II
Ordered Logit 2SLS-IV
Corruption (per Population) -1.965** -3.528**
(0.735) (1.333)
Neighbors' Management Quality -0.052 0.112
(Infrastructure Management) (0.333) (0.275)
Ln(Personal Income) -1.933 -1.749*
(1.252) (0.774)
Unemployment Rate -0.209 -0.244
(0.307) (0.246)
Government Ideology -0.022 -0.019
(0.011) (0.012)
Citizen Ideology 0.023 0.015
(0.023) (0.022)
Political Competition 1.685 1.759
(3.003) (2.556)
Social Trust -0.261 -0.218
(0.338) (0.248)
Governor's Institutional Power 1.966* 1.679*
(0.975) (0.671)
Ethnic Diversity 0.482 -1.348
(2.760) (2.141)
Constant 35.722
(26.477)
Year Dummies Included Included
Log-likelihood -90.611
Wald Chi2 (10) 22.260 22.610
Prob. > Chi2 0.014 0.012
R-squared 0.230
Root MSE 1.650
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The first-stage regression summary 
statistics of Model II are not reported. At the first-stage, both instruments 
are associated significantly-positively with the instrumented. Model II 
passes the weak instrument test with F (2, 38) > 10. Model II also passes 
the tests of over-identifying restrictions based on Sargan and Basman tests 
which fail to reject the null of valid instrument.
*p < .05; ** < .01; *** p < .001
